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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate tax policy exacerbates income and wealth disparity by 
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increasing the gaps between the rich and everyone else.  The corporate tax 
is a burden to taxpayers not in the highest tax brackets, while those 
taxpayers in the upper tax brackets can avoid it if they choose.  One of the 
fundamental principles in tax policy is fairness: the idea that those with 
higher incomes have a higher tax burden than those with lower incomes.  
Because of the structure of business tax policy, this notion of fairness has 
not been met, and instead those with higher incomes bear a lower tax 
burden on their investments than taxpayers with lower incomes. 
There are two pieces of business tax policy that create this injustice.  
First, the accredited investor rules of the Securities and Exchange Act 
provide that wealthy taxpayers can choose among a myriad of investments 
– publicly held corporations, hedge funds, partnerships and limited liability 
companies – whereas ordinary taxpayers can only choose from investments 
in publicly held corporations.  Second, the tax on corporate income is a 
double layer tax, whereas the tax on other investment choices is a single 
layer and most often at a lower rate.  When the Securities Act of 1933 was 
passed and the corporate income tax was enacted in 1916, the composition 
of stockholders was very different, and, therefore, the laws were enacted 
without the consequences that lower and ordinary income taxpayers now 
face as a result of the interaction of the two laws. The solution to this issue 
is to integrate the corporate and individual income taxes and then ensure 
that investment income from all investments are taxed at progressive tax 
rates, so that taxpayers with higher incomes do not ultimately have a lower 
tax burden than those with lower incomes. 
This article examines the most prominent corporate integration 
proposals and evaluates these proposals as they relate to the principles of 
equity and fairness.  The objective is to find an approach that achieves 
corporate integration and all of its goals while also mitigating any 
unfairness and inequity created by the proposal.  This article suggests ways 
to modify these integration proposals so that they also further vertical 
equity.  As currently designed, nearly all of the recent integration proposals 
do not address vertical equity at all or actually serve to exacerbate the 
unfairness of the corporate income tax. 
The corporate tax was initially enacted to tax the wealthy on their 
investments.1  As this article demonstrates, the corporate tax no longer 
 
 1.  See Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income 
Tax, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 452 (2001) (arguing that a corporate income tax was 
enacted as a means to reach the growing amount of wealth held in intangible assets such as 
stock).  The corporate tax in 1909 was actually an excise tax intended to reach wealthy 
taxpayers after the Supreme Court had ruled the income tax unconstitutional in 1894.  Id. at 
464; cf.  U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (granting Congress the power to collect income tax 
without regard to state population); Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166–81 (re-
imposing federal income tax). 
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serves to tax the wealthy and instead is a tax on ordinary taxpayers, 
permitting the wealthy a way to avoid the tax by choosing other 
investments if they prefer.  However, the misguided perception that 
eliminating the corporate tax will only serve to benefit the wealthy 
continues to persist.2  While the rich have continued to get richer, it is not 
the corporate tax that the rich have benefited from- it is the investment 
choices available to the rich that provide lower tax rates not available to 
ordinary taxpayers that has added to the growing wealth and income 
disparity.  Recent data demonstrates that the top 1% of taxpayers receive 
only 16.6% of their capital gain income from qualified dividends, whereas 
taxpayers in the second to lowest income quintile receive 62.4% of their 
capital gains come from qualified dividends, bearing the double layer of 
tax.3  The corporate tax disproportionately taxes the capital gains of 
taxpayers with lower incomes and spares those with the highest levels of 
income. 
This article will introduce and analyze various approaches to business 
tax policy, how corporate capital investment is taxed, and how the way 
capital investments in other entities are taxed “has an essential role to play 
in terms of progressivity, given the fact that capital income is so highly 
concentrated.”4  Part II of this article looks at concepts of fairness, Part III 
examines business tax policy, Part IV examines the accredited investor 
standard, Part V evaluates the corporate tax and looks at integration 
proposals, modifying them to achieve the goals of vertical equity, and Part 
VI concludes. 
I. FAIRNESS 
Basic fundamental principles in taxation include the precept that taxes 
must be equitable and fair.5
  
Fairness is determined by whether two chief 
 
 2.  See, e.g., David Kocieniewski, Since 1980s, the Kindest of Tax Cuts for the Rich, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2012, at A12 (asserting that tax cuts have benefitted the wealthy 
because investing is how they get a large percentage of their income). 
 3.  Calculations are from date of the Tax Policy Center.  See URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX 
POL’Y CTR., TABLE T-09-0484, DISTRIBUTION OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL GAINS AND 
QUALIFIED DIVIDENDS BY CASH INCOME PERCENTILE, 2010, BASELINE: CURRENT LAW 
(2009), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/numbers/Content/PDF/T09-0490.pdf (showing that 
the top 1% have $71,530 million in qualified dividends and  $429,575 million in all capital 
gains versus the second quintile having $4,455 million in qualified dividends and $7,133 
million in all capital gains). 
 4.  Kimberly A. Clausing, The Future of the Corporate Tax, 66 TAX L. REV. 419, 428 
(2013). 
 5.  See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 777 (Modern Library 1937) (1776) (explaining that taxes should be equitably 
distributed by how much a person earns); Scott A. Taylor, Corporate Integration in the 
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focus areas have been met: vertical equity and horizontal equity.6 
 
The 
concept of fairness is central to the thesis of this proposal: “[f]airness is the 
true focus of the corporate tax debate.”7 The horizontal equity theory holds 
that similarly situated taxpayers engaged in similar activities should pay 
analogous amounts of tax.8 
Vertical equity is the theory that taxes should be progressive, based on 
the idea that those with higher incomes have a greater ability to pay and 
more disposable income and, therefore, should have a higher tax burden, 
while those with a lesser amount of income have less of an ability to pay 
and less disposable income and, therefore, should have a lesser tax burden.9  
Ability-to-pay is determined by how much money taxpayers have available 
to pay taxes after the payment of necessities.  Lower-income taxpayers 
have a lower ability to pay and less disposable income, which places a 
greater tax burden on these taxpayers than the on higher-income taxpayers. 
Integrating corporate and individual income taxes and increasing the 
progressive tax rates on investment income will eliminate the two-layer tax 
imposed on non-accredited taxpayers.  Integration and higher progressive 
tax rates will ensure that taxpayers who earn more, and have a greater 
ability to pay, bear a higher burden of the tax. 
II. ACCREDITED INVESTORS 
Throughout this article, the term “ordinary taxpayer” is used to 
 
Federal Income Tax, 10 VA. TAX REV. 237, 242 (1990) (referencing Adam Smith’s 
assertion that equitable taxation yields a fair result based on each citizen’s income level). 
 6.  See H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 39 (1954), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4055 
[hereinafter HOUSE REPORT] (complimenting the bill on treating like outcomes, even though 
affected by different methods, the same under tax law; AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF 
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR TAX POLICY AND FAIRNESS 3 
(2007), available at 
http://www.aicpa.org/InterestAreas/Tax/Resources/TaxLegislationPolicy/Advocacy/Downlo
adableDocuments/TPCS%204%20-
%20principles%20for%20tax%20equity%20and%20fairness.doc.   
 7.  Yariv Brauner, The Non-Sense Tax: A Reply to New Corporate Income Tax 
Advocacy, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 591, 629 (2008).  Professor Brauner focuses on 
redistribution as the main element debated in fairness.  As illustrated here in great detail, 
redistribution is not the central element of why the corporate income tax is unfair.  It is 
unfair because higher income taxpayers can choose among other investments, leaving the 
high corporate tax rates to be imposed on those without a choice. 
 8.  See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 39 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
4017, 4055 (discussing the virtues of the proposed bill, insofar as it provides ex ante clarity 
by analogously taxing similarly situated parties); Alan J. Auerbach & Kevin A. Hassett, A 
New Measure of Horizontal Equity, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1116, 1116 (2002) (asserting that 
horizontal equity theoretically treats similarly situated people equally). 
 9.  Taylor, supra note 5, at 242-243 (explaining both horizontal and vertical equity).  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distinguish between wealthy taxpayers, who earn enough income or 
possess enough wealth to qualify as accredited investors under the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1933 and 1934, and “ordinary taxpayers,” 
who do not earn or own enough and are, therefore, classified as 
unsophisticated, non-accredited investors. 
Non-accredited investors include taxpayers that earn less than 
$200,000 a year individually or $300,000 as a married couple filing jointly 
or have less than $1 million in assets, not including their primary 
residence.10 
 
As a result, ordinary taxpayers, who are non-accredited 
investors, include a broad base of income levels and encompass the vast 
majority of taxpayers. 
The accredited investor rules were designed after the Great Depression 
to protect investors from relying on false or incomplete financial 
information from potential investments in business entities.11  The 
Securities and Exchange Commission was charged with regulating 
businesses and their financial disclosures, so that individual investors could 
trust those financial statements and disclosures of the businesses when 
selecting an investment, thereby avoiding some of the causes of the Great 
Depression.  The businesses that are regulated by the SEC, publicly held 
corporations, are the businesses in which non-accredited and accredited 
investors alike can invest. 
However, it became clear that the SEC could not regulate or properly 
investigate every business.  Businesses that were too new or were privately 
held and too small could not be evaluated and regulated by the SEC.  For 
this reason, the SEC decided that only investors who were determined to be 
“sophisticated” would be permitted to invest in these businesses.  Other 
investors would be limited to those businesses subject to SEC regulation: 
publicly held corporations. 
Whether an investor is sophisticated, and therefore an accredited 
investor, is determined by meeting an income test or a wealth test.12  An 
 
 10.  SEC Regulation D: Rules Governing the Limited Offer and Sale of Securities 
Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501, 230.504 
(2014). The definition of an accredited investor also includes someone who has over 
$1,000,000 in assets at the time of the purchase of the investment, not including their 
primary residence. Id.  
 11.  Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, Title I, § 4, 48 Stat. 77 (codified as amended 15 
U.S.C. § 77d (2012); SEC Regulation D: Rules Governing the Limited Offer and Sale of 
Securities Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–
508 (2007); Rule 504, 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2007); Rule 505, 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (2007); 
Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2007); see generally Wallis K. Finger, Note: 
Unsophisticated Wealth: Reconsidering the SEC’s “Accredited Investor” Definition Under 
the 1933 Act, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 733 (2009) (summarizing the SEC rules that were 
developed). 
 12.  Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2000); Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 
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accredited investor
 
is an individual who earns over $200,000 individually, 
or $300,000 if married, yearly for the past two years, with a reasonable 
anticipation of earning a similar amount, or an individual or couple with at 
least $1,000,000 in net worth, not including the value of the primary 
residence.13  Consequently, on the basis of the income test under the 
accredited investor rules, most Congressmen are unsophisticated investors, 
as are most of the other employees of the Federal Government.14  However, 
reality television star Scott Disick, and others like him, who earn money 
through club appearances, are sophisticated investors (his advisors 
however, may not be). 
As a result of these limitations on investment choices, non-accredited 
investors are limited to investing in the equity of publicly held 
corporations, while accredited investors may choose investments among 
corporation stock, as well as equity investments in hedge funds, real estate 
partnerships, venture capital partnerships, investment partnerships, and 
limited liability companies.15  Furthermore, only accredited investors can 
invest in initial public offerings (IPOs).16 
These regulations may have been enacted to protect unaccredited 
investors, but too often these rules serve instead to increase the amount of 
income and wealth disparity.  This is particularly true in light of the higher 
tax burdens imposed on corporate equity compared to the lower tax 
burdens on the investments available only to accredited investors, but not 
available to non-accredited, “unsophisticated” investors. Investors who do 
not qualify as accredited investors are precluded from investing in private 
 
230.501–508 (2007); Rule 504, 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2007); Rule 505, 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 
(2007); Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2007). 
 13.  Accredited investors also include several types of business entities, many of which 
must be owned by accredited investors themselves to avoid circumventing the rules.  
However, this article is evaluating the tax burdens placed on individuals and therefore the 
accredited investor rules outside of the application to individuals are not relevant here.  Rule 
501(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2007); see also Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 413, 124 Stat. 1376, 1577 (2010) (recent 
amendment excludes the primary residence from the calculation of net worth). 
 14.  See generally, Ida A. Brunick, Congressional Salaries and Allowances, 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (2014), available at 
http://www.senate.gov/CRSReports/crs-
publish.cfm?pid=‘0E%2C*PL%5B%3D%23P%20%20%0A (describing the salary of 
congressmen and women). 
 15.  There are exceptions to the accredited investor standards for friends, families, 
employees and those forming their own businesses, but this article is examining the tax rules 
and inequities placed on investors, therefore, these exceptions are not relevant to this 
discussion. 
 16.  See Finger, supra note 11, at 733 (illustrating the bar against non-accredited 
investors in trying to invest in private offerings). 
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offerings.17  Because the accredited investor standard forces investments by 
non-accredited investors into the high tax burden investments, the rule 
creates a regressive tax structure and violates vertical equity. 
III. THE STATE OF BUSINESS TAX POLICY 
The corporate tax needs to be reformed.  It is inefficient, unfair, 
burdensome, does not raise the desired revenue, and makes the United 
States less competitive internationally.18  “There is unanimous consensus 
regarding the need for reform.”19  Corporate integration serves as a means 
to increase vertical equity in corporate tax policy between low income or 
typical taxpayers and high-income taxpayers.20 
The three fundamental principles that guide the assessment and 
analysis of tax provisions are efficiency, simplicity, and fairness.21  Current 
corporate tax policy violates notions of vertical equity, a principle of 
fairness. Taxpayers are taxed differently depending on the type of business 
entity that they invest in.  However, hedge funds, partnerships, limited 
liability companies, and a variety of other business choices are only 
available to accredited investors, who earn high incomes or have a certain 
amount of wealth.22  Consequently, higher income investors are allowed to 
invest in certain entities with lower tax consequences, which are not 
available to lower income investors.  The freedom of the wealthy to select 
among investment options while ordinary taxpayers have limited 
investment choices, combined with the two layers of tax on corporate 
investment, violates the theory of vertical equity.  Corporate integration can 
alleviate or eliminate the vertical inequity.  Many integration proposals 
have been made, some alleviate vertical equity more than others, and some 
can be modified to address the inequity. 
 
 17.  Id.   
 18.  Clausing, supra note 4, at 428. 
 19.  Id. at 419. 
 20.  This article only examines the potential fairness issues for taxpayers who are acting 
as investors.  It does not discuss or examine any fairness issues present for taxpayers who 
are setting up or establishing a business.  
 21.  Richard Winchester, Parity Lost: The Price of a Corporate Tax in a Progressive 
World, 9 NEV. L. J. 130, 130 (2008)(citing M. LIVINGSTON, TAXATION: LAW, PLANNING AND 
POLICY xxxiv (2003)); see DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE 
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2009 REVENUE PROPOSALS 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-
FY2009.pdf (advocating that “Americans deserve a tax system that is simple, fair, and pro-
growth.”); see generally The President’s Advisory Panel of Federal Tax Reform: Simple, 
Fair, and Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix America’s Tax System (2005) (discussing 
efficiency, simplicity, and fairness, among other factors, and their relation to the tax codes). 
 22.  SEC Regulation D, supra note 10, at §§ 230.501, 230.504. 
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Ordinary taxpayers are limited in their investment choices by the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the accredited investor standard.  The security 
laws are designed to protect investors and to minimize the concealed risk 
investors may take.  One way the laws seek to do this is through the 
accredited investor rules.  One possible way to eliminate the vertical 
inequity created by the accredited investor standards is to repeal the 
standard.  However, the rules may serve a valuable purpose, and therefore 
the alternative is to attack the inequity through corporate tax policy.  It may 
not be possible or feasible to tax all investment identically, but if higher 
income taxpayers are a select group of permitted investors, those 
investments cannot have a preferred rate compared to higher tax 
investments available to all taxpayers. 
A. Who are stockholders and who carries a heavier burden for the 
corporate tax? 
The nature of stock ownership has changed with time, but corporate 
and business tax policy has not kept up with the changes in ownership.  
Historically, it was wealthy individuals who held stock.23  At present, stock 
is owned primarily by institutional investors, either through deferred 
retirement plans or directly by ordinary individuals.24  However, corporate 
tax policy has not stayed contemporary with these changes, remaining 
stagnant, and, as a result, the burden of the corporate tax, which was 
initially designed to impact wealthy individuals, now instead impacts 
ordinary taxpayers, either through direct or indirect ownership via 
intermediaries.  This obsolete tax policy, combined with the rules limiting 
certain investments to accredited investors creates a regressive tax structure 
on investments. 
A study by the Brookings Institute in 2009 examined the total amount 
of qualified dividends and capital gains rates received by taxpayers in 
quintiles based on income.25 While the wealthiest taxpayers received the 
 
 23.  See Bank, supra note 1, at 478 (proving that exclusive privileges were historically 
granted to corporations where the rich held much of their wealth); cf.   U.S. CONST. amend. 
XVI (granting Congress the power to collect income tax without regard to state population); 
Tariff Act, supra note 1, at 166–81 (re-imposing a federal income tax); Kristian Rydqvist, 
Joshua Spizman, Ilya Strebulaev, Government Policy and Ownership of Equity Securities, 
111 J. OF FIN. ECON. 70, 71 (2012) (discussing the changes in stock ownership from 
households to financial institutions). 
 24.  Rydqvist, supra note 23, at 71; see URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POL’Y CTR., supra note 
3 (showing tax ownership and income by quintile). 
 25.  Calculations are derived from data collected by the Tax Policy Center. See Urban-
Brookings Tax Pol’y Ctr., Table T09-0484, Distribution of Taxes on Long-Term Capital 
Gains and Qualified Dividends by Cash Income Percentile, 2010, Baseline: Current Law 
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highest amount of qualified dividends and capital gains, the percentage 
those qualified dividends made of their total capital gains created a very 
different picture, and demonstrated concretely that taxpayers with lower 
amounts of income carry a greater share of the corporate tax burden 
proportionately to their income. For example, the top 1% of the wealthiest 
taxpayers received only 16.6% of their capital gains from qualified 
dividends, the top 20% received 20.7% of their capital gains from qualified 
dividends, the fourth quintile received 47.3% of their capital gains from 
qualified dividends, the middle quintile received 53.6% of their capital 
gains from qualified dividends, and the second quintile received 62.4% of 
their capital gains from qualified dividends. Based on these numbers, it is 
clear that as income goes down, the proportion that dividends represent of 
capital gain income goes up, and, alternatively, as income goes up, the 
fewer dividends are part of capital gain. The corporate double tax is 
ensnaring those taxpayers in the lower brackets on their capital gains, while 
the wealthy are able to escape the corporate tax on most of their capital 
gains. 
Dividend tax rates became progressive in 2013, including three rates 
for taxpayers reaching 20%, in the highest ordinary income tax bracket.26 
These rates were also increased by a surcharge on capital gains of 3.8% by 
the Affordable Care Act.27 In spite of the progressivity built into the 
dividend tax rates, unfairness still exists - the progressivity is not sufficient 
to create vertical equity. The accredited investor standard still exists, and as 
a result, taxpayers with large amounts of wealth or income who will qualify 
as accredited investors have the ability to choose to invest in identical 
businesses held in different types of entities- a partnership that is subject to 
only a single layer of tax or a corporation that is subject to a double layer of 
tax. Higher income taxpayers can still choose between investing in a low 
tax entity versus a high tax entity, while ordinary taxpayers are only 
permitted to invest in publicly held corporations. As a result, investments 
by the wealthy are taxed at a lower rate and investments by ordinary 
taxpayers in corporations are subject to the double tax. Even though the 
capital gains rates are progressive, only higher income taxpayers have the 
option of choosing between identical investments in two types of business 
entities - entities with a single layer of tax or with a double layer of tax - 
ensuring that the higher income taxpayer will seek the most economically 
efficient return and will invest in an entity in which ordinary taxpayers 
 
(2009), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/numbers/Content/PDF/T09-0484.pdf. 
 26.  American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, H.R. 8, 112th Cong. (2013).  
 27.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 4872, 111th Cong. (2010), 
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. Law No. 111-152, 
124 Stat. 1029 (2010). 
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cannot invest. 
B. Calls to Revise the Corporate Tax 
Much has been made in the public and legislature about corporate 
inversions and corporations fleeing the United States taxing jurisdiction 
because of high corporate income tax rates.28 The United States Treasury 
Department has stated that inversions cost the United States billions in lost 
taxes each year.29 Corporations are encouraged to earn their income 
elsewhere to avoid the high tax rates in the United States.30 Lowering tax 
rates alone, as a sole remedy, is not enough to address the issues with 
competitiveness of the United States internationally; it is not enough to fix 
the many issues with the corporate tax, and it is not enough to redress the 
lack of fairness created by the corporate tax.31 
A growing consensus of experts have suggested that it is imperative 
we re-evaluate the corporate income tax.32
 
 There is a bipartisan call to 
revise the corporate tax because it is decidedly complex and inefficient, and 
because of the harm it does to the competitiveness of the United States.33 
 
 28.  See Tyler M. Dumler, Charging Less to Make More: The Causes and Effects of the 
Corporate Inversion Trend in the U.S. and the Implications of Lowering the Corporate Tax 
Rate, 13 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 89 (2012)(examining the causes and effects of tax avoidance 
schemes, including the corporate inversion trend, pursued by U.S. multinational 
corporations (INCs)). 
 29.  See Corporate Inversion: Hearing on S. 2119 Before the S. Subcomm. on Treasury 
and Gen. Gov’t of the Comm. on Appropriations, 107th Cong. 39 (2002)(statement of 
William Gale, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director for Economic Studies, The Brookings 
Institution)(examining in depth the inversion cost due to lost taxes).  
 30.  See Principles for Comprehensive Income Tax Reform: Testimony Before the 
United States S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Daniel N. Shaviro, 
Wayne Perry Professor of Taxation, New York University School of Law) [hereinafter 
Shaviro] (detailing Professor Shaviro’s statements on the need to reform U.S. tax policy); 
THE WHITE HOUSE, FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY SUMMIT 29 (Feb. 23, 2009) [hereinafter FISCAL 
RESPONSIBILITY SUMMIT]. 
 31.  See David Cay Johnston, Keynote Address at the Kansas Journal of Law & Public 
Policy’s 2012 Symposium, Corporate Tax Reform: Making America Competitive, 21 KAN. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 371, 372 (2012)(calling for active reform of the American tax system). 
 32.  See Shaviro, supra note 30 (providing Professor Shaviro’s viewpoint on re-
evaluating the corporate income tax); FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY SUMMIT, supra note 30; see 
also Michael Doran, Managers, Shareholders, and the Corporate Double Tax, 95 VA. L. 
REV. 517, 518 (2009) (“[A] recent turn of the wheel has again put forth one of the more 
intriguing reform proposals: relief from the double taxation of corporate income.”); David 
Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 
1627, 1637 (1999) (citing opponents of double taxation); see generally George K. Yin, 
Corporate Tax Reform, Finally, After 100 Years, TAX ANALYSTS 114 (2009) (arguing for 
changing the tax system). 
 33.  See Noel B. Cunningham & Mitchell L. Engler, Prescription for Corporate Income 
Tax Reform: A Corporate Consumption Tax, 66 TAX L. REV. 445, 445 (2013) (“[T]here is a 
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President Obama has declared a need to revise the corporate income tax.34 
Corporations spend significant resources trying to navigate or circumvent 
the corporate income tax.35 The Treasury Department recently advised that 
relief from the double corporate tax would increase overall economic 
growth.36 Furthermore, the United States has one of the highest statutory 
and effective corporate tax rates in the world.37
 
Some experts have 
advanced that the corporate tax policy has diminished the United States’ 
competitiveness, costing jobs and decreasing the tax base.38
  
They have 
suggested that corporate integration would make the United States more 
competitive by lowering or eliminating the corporate income tax rates.39 
Vertical equity and fairness are missing, however, from the discourse. 
Absent from the debate regarding the state of the corporate income tax and 
integration, is the prospect that corporate integration could further vertical 
equity by increasing progressivity, and eliminating the repressiveness of 
the corporate tax policy. As one commentator noted, if a study of the deals 
made by Bain Capital Management was done it would reveal that most of 
the deals would have been organized as a pass through entity because 
“virtually the only tax ever paid is the 15% by the owners of the firm.”40 
Ensuring that accredited investors with high incomes carry a higher tax 
burden than lower income, non-accredited, investors will eliminate the 
regressivity of the corporate tax policy combined with the accredited 
investor standards. 
 
widely-shared bipartisan view that the corporate income tax is a ‘bad’ tax that is desperately 
in need of reform or repeal”). 
 34.  THE WHITE HOUSE & DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK FOR 
BUSINESS TAX REFORM (2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/Documents/The-Presidents-Framework-for-Business-Tax-Reform-02-22-2012.pdf. 
 35.  JOINT ECON. COMM., REFORMING THE U.S. CORPORATE TAX SYSTEM TO INCREASE 
TAX COMPETITIVENESS (2005), available at 
http://www.jec.senate.gov/republicans/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=f1647b9a-4418-
4bb1-8b03-941a528ae6fc. 
 36.  DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY CONFERENCE ON BUSINESS TAXATION AND 
GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS: BACKGROUND PAPER 1–2, 710 (2007), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/07230%20r.pdf [hereinafter 
TREASURY CONFERENCE].   
 37.  See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT TAX 
DATABASE, CORPORATE AND CAPITAL INCOME TAXES, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/tax-database.htm#C_CorporateCaptial [hereinafter 
OECD Corporate Rates 2009](showing the United States with the second highest corporate 
tax rate and the highest central government corporate tax rate); see also TREASURY 
CONFERENCE, supra note 36, at 35 (stating within the OECD, the United States has the 
second highest statutory corporate rate and the fourth highest effective marginal rate).   
 38.  Id. at 1–2.   
 39.  See TREASURY CONFERENCE, supra note 36 (explaining the positive effects of 
corporate integration).  
 40.  Johnston, supra note 31, at 374. 
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IV. THE CORPORATE TAX 
The structure of the corporate income tax is not aligned with the 
vertical equity principle and imposes a higher burden on other taxpayers. 
The corporate income tax is often referred to as a double tax, but 
technically the term “double tax” is not accurate because there is not an 
equal tax applied twice. Instead, there is a corporate income tax, and then a 
second tax at the individual shareholder level on earnings generated by the 
corporation that are distributed to the shareholders, and the increase of 
value in the stock when the shareholder sells his investment.41 The 
undistributed earnings of the corporation increase the value of the 
corporation’s stock so that earnings of the corporation are taxed to 
shareholders either as distributions or when the stock is sold.42 
A. Rationales for the Corporate Tax 
The rationales behind the corporate tax must be evaluated to ensure 
that those principles are still relevant all these years later, and to make 
certain that alternative methods of corporate tax and integration can still 
achieve the relevant goals. One of the most prevalent justifications for the 
tax policy on corporations is that the corporate income tax serves as a 
means to tax wealth, particularly because when it was enacted, there was 
no individual income tax.43 This was the reasoning given for enacting the 
corporate tax in 1909.44 Back when it was enacted, the corporate tax was an 
effective method for reaching wealth since much of the wealth in the 
United States was held in corporations.45 At that time, the corporate income 
tax was seen as a means of maintaining or increasing progressivity and 
 
 41.  See Taylor, supra note 5, at 246 (“[A] ten dollar dividend from a share of stock is 
no different from a ten dollar increase in the value of the same stock. Yet the realization 
model taxes the dividend but not the increase in value.”). 
 42.  See DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S 
FISCAL YEAR 2004 REVENUE PROPOSALS 11 (2003), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-
FY2004.pdf (providing that earnings retained by a corporation increase the value of the 
stock and as a result, the value of the stock reflects the retained earnings). 
 43.  Bank, supra note 1, at 452, 478 (arguing that a corporate income tax was enacted 
as a means to reach the growing amount of wealth held in intangible assets such as stock). 
 44.  The corporate tax in 1909 was actually an excise tax intended to reach wealthy 
taxpayers after the Supreme Court had ruled the income tax unconstitutional in 1894. Id. at 
478;   U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166–81. 
 45.  See Steven A. Bank, Is Double Taxation a Scapegoat for Declining Dividends? 
Evidence from History, 56 TAX. L. REV. 463, 478 (2002) (explaining the reasons behind 
passing corporate taxation). 
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avoiding the significant evasion that was common.46 When the Sixteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution was passed, the individual income tax was 
enacted and resulted in the two layers of tax on corporate income.47 
However, the preferred investment vehicles for the wealthy are 
different from the investment choices available in 1909. In 1909, there 
were no hedge funds, limited liability companies, or complex financial 
products. Accordingly, wealth is held and invested differently today than 
how it was in 1909, and yet tax policy on corporate income taxes has not 
kept pace with these changes. For example, investments in partnerships and 
many limited liability companies are not subject to an entity level tax. 
Instead, only the investor bears the burden of the tax in his personal income 
tax rates. Consequently, the current corporate income tax encourages self-
integration when choosing the entity to form a business and the type of 
investment options, such as choosing the partnership form rather than the 
corporate form, and subsequently the choice of investments in the different 
entities.48
 
However, since these investment choices are limited to accredited 
investors, the corporate tax policy becomes regressive because non-
accredited investors do not have the option of self-integration through 
investment choice, and therefore bear a higher tax burden than higher 
income taxpayers. 
“Up to 40% of all stocks in the United States- and between 60% and 
85% of stocks held by domestic agents such as mutual funds, pension 
funds, and insurance companies are now kept in tax-deferred plans.”49 Tax 
deferred plans imply that the individuals are not paying tax yet, but the 
implications of the regressive nature of the corporate tax still affect stock 
held in tax deferred plans because the corporation is paying the income tax 
and, therefore, the indirect equity investment held by the taxpayer carries 
the tax burden of the corporate income tax. When the taxpayer withdraws 
his investment, he will be subject to tax at ordinary income tax rates, not 
just on the deferred income from his labor, but also on the appreciation 
value of his equity investment. 
Congress used the corporate tax as a way to regulate corporations 
 
 46.  See JANE GRAVELLE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, CORPORATE TAX INTEGRATION: 
ISSUES AND OPTIONS 3 (1991) (arguing while progressivity is often given as a justification, it 
may be overstated);   see generally STEPHEN FRANCIS WESTON, PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE IN 
TAXATION 283 (1903)(examining the tax system’s complications through an analysis of the 
political, economic and ethical principles of taxation). 
 47.  U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 166–81. 
 48.  See generally DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND 
CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE vii (1992), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/integration.pdf (describing 
different methods of integration). 
 49.  Rydqvist, supra note 23, at 3 (2012). 
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before the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934.50 After these acts were passed, 
however, Congress did not also review the corporate tax in light of no 
longer needing this second layer of oversight. 
The varied tax structures and disparate tax burdens for different types 
of entities are normally rationalized by the assumption that distinct 
business entities have distinct privileges and design entitling them to 
different tax burdens. Absent, however, in this analysis, is the recognition 
that only wealthy or high income taxpayers deemed “sophisticated” 
accredited investors can invest directly in most of these entities, while the 
vast majority of taxpayers are limited to investments in publicly held 
corporations. Unfortunately, this consideration has been neglected when 
deciding corporate tax policy. 
The income generated from businesses has changed with time as well. 
Business income received by unincorporated forms of business increased 
from twenty-one percent in 1980 to fifty percent in 2008.51 Revenue is a 
significant consideration for any corporate integration recommendation. 
The potential for revenue loss if the corporate income tax is repealed is 
often identified as a potential barrier to corporate integration.52
  
Some have 
argued that the corporate income tax is not in fact a significant source of 
revenue.53 The challenge then becomes apportioning the tax burden from 
the missing revenue among the taxpayers that should properly bear the tax 
burden. However, in most contexts, placing the responsibility for the lost 
revenue on the corporation is misplaced. Rather, the revenue obligation is 
more fittingly assigned to the individual investors because it is individuals 
that carry the burden of the corporate income tax.54 There is a debate over 
who ultimately bears the incidence of the corporate tax: shareholders 
 
 50.  SEC Regulation D: Rules Governing the Limited Offer and Sale of Securities 
Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501, 230.504 
(2010) (defining an accredited investor as also including someone who has over $1,000,000 
in assets at the time of the purchase of the investment). 
 51.  J. GREGORY BALLENTINE, EQUITY, EFFICIENCY AND THE U.S. CORPORATE INCOME 
TAX 5 (1980); see STEVEN A. BANK, FROM SWORD TO SHIELD, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
CORPORATE INCOME TAX, 1861 TO PRESENT xviii (2010) [hereinafter FROM SWORD TO 
SHIELD] (noting that the corporate income tax still does serve as meaningful revenue 
source). 
     52. See David J. Shakow, Wither, “C”!, 45 TAX L. REV. 177, 213 (1990) (“A significant 
political problem with a proposal for corporate integration is that it would eliminate all or 
part of the corporate tax, a significant source of federal revenues.”). 
 53.  See Yariv Brauner, The Non-Sense Tax: A Reply to New Corporate Income Tax 
Advocacy, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 591, 592-593 (2008)  (citing Organization for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development, Revenue Statistics 1965–2006 (2007)).   
 54.  David A. Weisbach, The Irreducible Complexity of Firm-Level Income Taxes: 
Theory and Doctrine in the Corporate Tax, 60 TAX L. REV. 215, 218 (2007); JOINT ECON. 
COMM., supra note 35, at 2.  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through less profits, consumers through higher prices or labor through 
lower wages or unemployment.55 Recent studies indicate that the burden of 
the corporate income tax falls on labor.56 Ultimately, however, whether it is 
the investor or the consumer or labor, the corporate tax is not borne by the 
corporation, but by individuals. 
Another outdated explanation for the corporate income tax is the 
benefit theory. A separate justification for the corporate tax, known as the 
benefit theory of limited liability, was that the various legal protections 
corporations receive due to their classification as a separate entity justified 
the tax.57 The benefit theory asserts that because the shareholders of 
corporations are entitled to limited liability, this limited liability is a taxable 
government service.58 Notwithstanding the limited liability that 
shareholders enjoy, because of the similar limited liability enjoyed by 
members in a limited liability company, limited partnerships and other 
types of entities not subject to an additional tax for this government service, 
this theory is no longer relevant. 
The two layer corporate income tax is frequently justified as a way to 
raise revenue.59 Some argue that the revenue from corporate income is 
overstated.60 Many corporations pay taxes and do generate revenue.  
However, if the corporate tax is revised, any perceived lost revenue can be 
made up by taxing the appropriate individuals, the investors, which would 
increase the burden on the wealthier taxpayers with a greater ability to pay, 
resulting in more corporations remaining in the United States rather than 
 
 55.  See Adam H. Rosenzweig, A Corporate Tax for the Next One Hundred Years: A 
Proposal for a Dynamic, Self-Adjusting Corporate Tax Rate, 108 NW. U.L. REV. 1029, 1032 
(2014) (discussing different sides of the argument).    
 56.  WILLIAM M. GENTRY, DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE ON THE 
INCIDENCE OF CORPORATE TAX 32, 35 (2007); JULIE-ANNE CRONIN ET AL., DEPT. OF THE 
TREASURY OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, DISTRIBUTING THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX: REVISED 
U.S. TREASURY METHODOLOGY 2 (2012), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/tax-analysis/Documents/OTA-T2012-05-Distributing-the-Corporate-Income-Tax-
Methodology-May-2012.pdf; Bruce Bartlett, Who Pays the Corporate Income Tax, N.Y. 
TIMES ECONOMIX BLOG (Feb. 19, 2013, 6:00 AM), 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/who-pays-the-corporate-income-tax/ 
(summarizing 4 recent articles discussing the incidence of the corporate income tax). 
 57.  See BALLENTINE, supra note 51, at 5 (stating “[w]hile limited liability may provide 
very large benefits, it is a virtually costless government service”). While this is true, limited 
liability is provided by the state corporate codes, not by the federal government or the 
federal taxing authority. Thus, the federal government was taxing corporations on a 
“benefit” that it did not bestow upon them. 
 58.  Id.   
 59.  See, e.g., FROM SWORD TO SHIELD, supra note 51, at xviii (noting that the corporate 
income tax still does serve as meaningful revenue source). 
 60.  See BALLENTINE, supra note 51, at 7 (“The need for revenue as the sole reason for a 
tax could give rise to odious taxes.”). 
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leaving through corporate inversions and similar techniques. 61
 
The corporate income tax is also used as a tool for taxing foreign 
investors and tax-exempt investors that invest in corporate equity and 
would escape taxes without applying the tax at the corporate entity level.62 
Some of these tax-exempt entities are deferred tax plans and other 
retirement plans where the investments will ultimately be subject to tax 
when the investments are distributed. 
B. The Impact of the Corporate Tax on Fairness 
The cumulative tax rate on corporate earnings is essentially a flat tax 
and not in any way progressive, despite the goals of vertical equity. The tax 
rate on corporate equity investments is the same regardless of a taxpayer’s 
income level. The progressivity reflected in the tax rates on corporate 
income was eliminated in 2003 and only returned in a moderate form in 
2013. However, when coupled with the choices that a high-income 
taxpayer can make as an accredited investor, whether the system reflects 
any vertical equity is tenuous. Prior to 2003, dividends were taxed as 
ordinary income, while the sale or exchange of an investment was 
characterized as capital.63 The progressivity of ordinary income rates 
ensured that high-income taxpayers at least carried a higher tax burden with 
respect to dividends, if not other capital gains.64 In 2003, dividend taxation 
 
 61.  See Jon Greenberg, Sanders: One out of four corporations pay no taxes, Tampa 
Bay Times, available at http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
meter/statements/2013/sep/26/bernie-s/sanders-one-out-four-corporations-pay-no-taxes/; 
Robert S. McIntyre, Matthew Gardner & Richard Phillips, The Sorry State of Corporate 
Taxes: What Fortune 500 Firms Pay (or Don’t Pay) in the USA and What They Pay Abroad 
— 2008 to 2012 (2014), available at 
http://www.ctj.org/corporatetaxdodgers/sorrystateofcorptaxes.pdf.   
 62.  See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the 
Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1201-1202 (2004) (explaining the defenses of the 
current corporate tax structure).   
 63.  Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (“JGTRRA”), Pub. L. No. 
108-27, 117 Stat. 752, Sec. 302. When dividends were taxed as ordinary income, some 
taxpayers were able to use the corporate form to shelter income when their individual 
ordinary rates would have exceeded the corporate rate. This assumes investors chose to 
invest in corporations rather than other options available to them as accredited investors. See 
Mark P. Gergen, How Corporate Integration Could Kill the Market for Corporate Tax 
Shelters, 61 TAX L. REV. 145, 156 (2008) (describing the decision-making process for 
choosing a corporate form when considering tax implications); see also Gravelle, supra note 
46, at 5 (discussing the different tax statuses); William Plumb, The Federal Income Tax 
Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and Proposal, 26 TAX L. REV. 369, 
374–75 (1970) (analyzing how corporations’ accumulation of earnings can enable 
shareholders to avoid the double-tax). 
 64.  I.R.C. § 1(a)-(c). While ordinary income tax rates are intended to be progressive in 
their increasing in percentage as income levels increase, whether they are in fact progressive 
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was revised and dividends and capital gains were taxed at a flat 15%, 
regardless of a taxpayer’s income level. In 2013, capital gains rates were 
amended to be more progressive and, as a result, dividend tax rates jumped 
from 15% to 18.8% (15% plus 3.8% from the Medicare) for joint taxpayers 
making over $250,000 up to 23.8% (20% plus 3.8%) for joint taxpayers 
that make over $400,000.65 
In addition to the capital gains rates on dividends, the corporate 
income tax rate is also not progressive. The corporate income tax rate is a 
flat 34%.66 Combining that tax with the capital gain tax results in a total 
individual tax rate, applicable to income generated by corporations of 
between 43.9% and 49.75%.67 
Further exacerbating the lack of vertical equity and the regressive 
nature of the corporate income tax is the fact that income tax rates are 
higher than non-accredited investors’ ordinary tax rate. The individual 
income tax rate ranges from 35% to 39.6% for taxpayers earning between 
$405,100 and $457,600 respectively.68 For taxpayers earning less than 
$300,000, the minimum income level needed to meet the accredited 
investor standard, the tax rate drops from 33% to 10% while the typical 
corporate tax rate ranges from 35% to 38%.69 As this illustrates, the 
corporate income tax rate is higher for non-accredited investors than their 
personal tax rate, whereas the corporate income tax is lower than the tax 
rate for accredited investors. The higher tax rate on corporate income 
means non-accredited investors bear a higher tax burden on their 
investment income than from their earnings from labor or interest.70 The 
ability to choose among investments in various types of entities, and in 
particular tax-efficient pass though entities, affects the tax burdens on 
investors. 
Vertical equity supports progressive tax systems by imposing a larger 
portion of the income tax on those with both a greater ability to pay and 
more disposable income. Ironically, the corporate income tax may actually 
 
is questionable. Ordinary income tax rates are essentially flat once a taxpayer earns over 
$375,000, whether that be $3,750,000 or $375,000,000.
 
However slight, the ordinary 
income rates on dividend income formerly offered a semblance of progressivity for non-
accredited taxpayers. 
 65.  I.R.C. § 1(h)(11). 
 66.  The rate changed to 35% for a brief period and then returned to 34%. I.R.C. § 11. 
 67.  
 
I.R.C. § 1 (a), (b), (c), (h). The current corporate tax rate according to I.R.C. § 1 is 
35%. Therefore, if a corporation earns $100, its income tax will be $35, leaving $65 to be 
distributed to shareholders. The current capital gains rate in I.R.C. § 1(h) is 15%, so the tax 
on the $65 would be $9.75. This means out of $100 in earnings $44.75, or 44.75%, is taxed. 
 68.  I.R.C. § 1 (a). 
 69.  I.R.C. § 11 (a). 
 70.  
 
I.R.C. § 1(a), (b), (c), (h); I.R.C. § 11. 
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be regressive, as those with lower incomes potentially have a higher tax 
burden than those with larger incomes. The combination of preferential 
capital gain rates, high corporate income tax rates, and the limitation on the 
investment choices of non-accredited investors results in a regressive tax 
burden. 
Some contend the burden created the corporate income tax is 
progressive because, although the income tax rates are flat, the taxpayers 
bearing its burden are the wealthy, who hold the vast majority of corporate 
stock.71
  
However, while this viewpoint may have been accurate in the past, 
it is no longer an accurate characterization of corporate stock ownership. 
Although the corporate income tax was originally enacted as a proxy for 
tax wealth, since the wealthy are no longer the primary stockholders, the 
income tax actually primarily affects ordinary shareholders and 
institutional investors. Strebulaev and his coauthors, Kristian Rydqvist and 
Joshua Spizman of Binghamton University in New York, made the 
empirical discovery that up to 70% of all stocks in the United States - held 
by domestic agents such as mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance 
companies - are now kept in tax-deferred plans. They found “[i]n the 
United States, just after the war [World War II], households directly 
own[ed] 90% of the stock market; by 2010, this figure has come down to 
below 30%. The share ownership has largely migrated to financial 
institutions that have ascended to the largest holder of equity. In 2010, 
domestic financial institutions own almost 50% of U.S. stocks.”72 They 
estimated that “up to 40% of all stocks in the United States between 60% 
and 85% of stocks held by domestic agents such as mutual funds, pension 
funds, and insurance companies—are now kept in tax-deferred plans.”73 
Some academics dismiss the need for integration or the treatment of 
ordinary taxpayers by claiming that despite the tax rates, the wealthy 
ultimately bear the burden of the corporate tax. Resolving which taxpayers 
bear the burden of the corporate income tax is a fundamental question to 
appropriately designing the tax.74 There are three parties who each may 
bear the majority of the tax burden: investors, consumers, or labor.75 The 
 
 71.  Bank, supra note 51, at xviii. 
 72.  Rydqvist, Spizman, & Strebulaev, supra note 23, at 2. 
 73.  Id. at 1-2. 
 74.  See William M. Gentry, A Review of the Evidence on the Incidence of the 
Corporate Income Tax, DEPT. OF THE TREASURY (2007) available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/ota101.pdf 
(noting the uncertainty of who bears the burden of the corporate tax); see also Emil Sunley, 
Corporate Integration: An Economic Perspective, 47 TAX L. REV. 621, 623-26 
(1992)(analyzing how various forms of corporate integration would affect the tax burden). 
 75.  Gentry, supra note 56; see also Gravelle, supra note 46, at 34-35 (discussing tax 
burdens). 
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latest studies conclude labor bears most of the corporate tax’s burdens 
rather than investors.76 Because of how the primary investors in 
corporations have changed, regardless of whether the burden is placed on 
investors or labor, the ordinary taxpayer bears the tax burden (as opposed 
to the wealthy or even corporations themselves).77 
C. Fairness in Light of the Issues Raised by Accredited Investor 
Standards 
Wealthy taxpayers, because they are accredited investors, have 
investment options. If they find investing in corporations to be too 
expensive, the wealthy have the freedom to make less expensive 
investments, enabling better returns and creating less of a tax burden. 
Corporations typically carry a higher tax burden than partnerships.78 
Ordinary taxpayers, however, do not have this choice and are limited to 
investing in highly taxed corporate stock. 
The tax legislation that provided that dividends from corporations 
would be taxed at capital gains rates, rather than ordinary income, 
mitigated some of the regressive nature of the tax burden placed on non-
accredited investors. However, it did not eliminate the regressive nature of 
the corporate income tax itself. It did not make the tax burdens placed on 
equity ownership progressive and did not result in vertical equity. 
Vertical equity is not possible because of the accredited investor rules. 
Taxpayers with enough income or wealth to qualify as an accredited 
investor can choose from identical investments, some of which are taxed at 
the investor’s tax rate because ownership is through a partnership or an 
limited liability company as compared with others that would bear the 
burden of the corporate income tax, as well as ownership takes the form of 
corporate stock. The accredited investor can choose which investment will 
be more economically efficient. Non-accredited investors, in contrast, are 
limited to only investing in corporate stock, even though that investment 
carries a high tax burden. This choice, or lack there of, coupled with the tax 
policies in place for taxing corporate income and stock versus partnership 
ownership create a regressive tax burden. “[T]he double tax puts the public 
businesses at a disadvantage” to private businesses not subject to two layers 
of taxation, demonstrating the lack of vertical equity.79 The only investment 
option available to non-accredited investor taxpayers, save for specific 
 
 76.  Id. at 32-35. 
 77.  See David Weisbach, supra note 54, at 218 (explaining who bears the burden of 
corporate tax). 
 78.  See Bank, supra note 51, at xii–xiii (comparing the tax burden of various entities).
 
 
 79.  Doran, supra note 32, at 528. 
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limited exceptions, is to invest in a public corporation. However, tax policy 
provides that corporations face a double tax, an initial tax on corporate 
income and a second tax on distributions to the shareholder. Partnership 
income, however including income from LLCs taxed as partnerships, is 
typically only taxed once. 
Only accredited investors are permitted to invest in both public 
corporations and pass-through entities. Non-accredited investors are 
considered too unsophisticated to invest in the partnership or the LLC taxed 
as a partnership. As a result, ordinary taxpayers who are not accredited 
investors face a higher tax burden.
 
Corporate investments bear an average 
tax of thirty percent, whereas investments in partnerships are taxed at a 
twenty percent rate.80
  
“Effective tax rates on corporate equity capital are 
seventy percent higher than rates on non-corporate equity capital.”81 
In the debate over corporate integration, many critics of integration 
demonstrate a disregard of non-accredited investors. Some argue the 
double tax is elective because taxpayers can simply choose to invest in 
either a corporation or in an entity such as a partnership or LLC.82
 
However, non-accredited investors cannot choose between these 
investments. The corporate income tax is elective for accredited investors, 
but not for non-accredited investors.83 
Because non-accredited investors are not considered sophisticated 
enough to invest in entities with a single layer of tax, it could be argued 
that the higher tax burden these taxpayers face is instead the cost of better 
security in their investments as provided by oversight by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. Essentially, the higher tax burden imposed on non-
accredited investors could be seen as a fee the investor must pay for 
government supervision. “Whether it makes policy sense or not, the 
corporate double tax serves as a toll charge imposed by the government on 
 
 80.  Bank, supra note 51, at xii–xiii. 
 81.  See Gravelle, supra note 46, at 14 (providing that there is “no ideal solution . . . as 
long as tax-exempt entities maintain their preferential tax treatment”). 
 82.  See Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth, Office of the 
Secretary Department of the Treasury, at 135 (1984), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/tres84v1All.pdf (noting the 
neutrality in the selection of organizational form would eliminate such tax differences and 
the ability to circumvent the double tax). 
 83.  The number of accredited individual investors was estimated to be between 5 and 
7.2 million people prior to the enactment of Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, which in turn decreased the number of accredited investors by excluding 
primary residences from the calculation of net worth. See Scott Shane, How Dodd’s Reform 
Plan Hurts Startup Finance, BUSINESSWEEK, March 19, 2010, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/mar2010/sb20100318_367600.htm 
(examining the reduction of the number of accredited informal investors from 121,000 to 
174,000 people in the United States). 
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accessing capital through the securities markets.”84
 
And because accredited 
investors can elect not to pay the “fee” by investing in lower tax burden 
investments, the fee is only mandatory for non-accredited investor 
taxpayers, who cannot make unregulated investments. The corporate tax 
penalizes businesses that choose to be corporations rather than other forms 
such as limited liability companies or partnerships.85 
The violation of vertical equity caused by the accredited investor 
standard and the tax burden felt by investors in corporations versus 
taxpayers in partnerships is evidenced by the following example illustrating 
the after tax returns for a non-accredited taxpayer’s investment in a public 
corporation as compared with the after tax returns of an accredited 
investors in a partnership. Alex is an accredited investor who invests 
$200,000 in a partnership, Pennsatucky, which is in the business of 
pharmaceutical distribution. In 2014, Pennsatucky earns and distributes 
$15,000 in pretax ordinary income earnings on Alex’s $200,000 investment 
as a pass-through entity. Pennsatucky will not pay a tax on its earnings or 
on distribution to Alex. Alex in turn incurs a single level tax at a maximum 
ordinary rate of thirty-five percent on the $15,000 partnership earnings, 
resulting in a tax of $5,250 and an after-tax return of $9,750 to Alex, an 
effective tax rate of 35%. The effective rate would be even lower if the 
income from Pennsatucky is capital. If his income was considered capital, 
Alex would be taxed $3,570 and receive an after tax return of $11,430, 
reflecting a burden of 23.8% percent (assuming the highest capital gain tax 
rate). 
Contrast Alex’s tax burden with non-accredited investor Piper who 
invests $200,000 in the publicly traded corporation Dandelion, which is 
also engaged in pharmaceutical distribution. If Piper earns $15,000 of 
pretax earnings on her $200,000 investment, Dandelion will incur a 
corporate tax of $5,250. It can then distribute a dividend of $9,750 to Piper, 
who will incur a second level of tax of $1,462.50 ($65 dividend distribution 
multiplied by the 15% tax rate) resulting in an after tax return of $8,287.50 
and an effective tax rate of 44.75%. The effective rate will not be lower for 
Piper, even if the income earned by Dandelion is capital. Therefore if the 
income is capital, Piper’s after tax return will still be $8,287.50 and her 
effective tax rate would remain 44.75%. 
The regressive nature of the corporate tax burden and the concomitant 
violation of vertical equity is apparent in the additional tax burden that 
Piper bears of 9.75 %, if the business generates ordinary income, or 
 
 84.  Doran, supra note 32, at 528. 
 85.  Noel B. Cunningham and Mitchell L. Engler, supra note 33, at 447; Joseph J. 
Thorndike, The Durability of a Dysfunctional Tax: Public Opinion and the Failure of 
Corporate Tax Reform, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 347, 354 (2012). 
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20.95% if the business generates capital income because Piper is a non-
accredited investor and can only select the Dandelion investment. In 
contrast, Alex can choose which entity to invest in, put forward an identical 
amount as Piper in the same type of business, and still generate an identical 
amount of pre-tax earnings on her $200,000 investment. Despite how 
equivalent their businesses are, Alex is bears a lower tax burden even 
though she is a high income tax payer. Alex has the choice to invest in 
either Pennsatucky or Dandelion whereas Piper is only permitted to invest 
in Dandelion. 
Ironically, to achieve the same after-tax result as Alex (an after-tax 
return of $9,750), Piper, the taxpayer deemed “unsophisticated” as an non-
accredited investor, will have to consistently make significantly superior 
investment decisions than Alex, the “sophisticated” accredited investor. 
Specifically, Piper will have to make an investment in a publicly traded 
corporation that would generate pre-tax earnings of $17,647 (compared to 
Alex’s $15,000) on her $200,000 investment in order to realize an after tax 
return of $9,750. If the business generated capital income, Piper would 
have to select an investment in a publicly traded corporation that generates 
$20,688 of pre-tax earnings compared to Alex’s investment earnings of 
$15,000 to match Alex’s after-tax returns. This scenario reveals the 
regressive nature of the corporate income tax burden when examined in 
conjunction with the investment choice limitations placed on ordinary 
taxpayers by the accredited investor standard. 
As a result of the lack of vertical equity in the tax policy for 
corporations and the fact that non-accredited investors face a higher tax 
burden on equivalent investments compared with accredited investors, non-
accredited investors face greater pressure to make investments that generate 
significantly superior returns in order to earn a similar amount after taxes. 
Accredited investors are permitted to avoid paying the structural tax 
penalty inherent in investments in publicly traded corporations, while non-
accredited investors do not have the ability to elect out of the corporate tax 
burden. 
V. SOLUTIONS TO THE VERTICAL EQUITY ISSUE IN CORPORATE TAX 
POLICY 
There are ultimately two possible solutions to addressing the unequal 
tax burden placed on non-accredited investors by corporate tax policy. The 
first is to revisit the accredited investor standard. The second is to revise 
the corporate income tax to address the inequity caused by rates and the 
double tax. This article is focused on the latter of these options. 
There are several possible strategies to eliminating the inequity caused 
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by the corporate tax. These include actions as simple as raising the tax rates 
on those who qualify as accredited investors beyond the tax rates applicable 
to ordinary investors. An alternative way of addressing the issue, and the 
focus of this article, is to integrate the corporate and individual income 
taxes to achieve vertical equity. This article argues that corporate 
integration is necessary to maintain and promote a progressive income tax. 
The theory of vertical equity depends upon progressive tax rates and 
burdens; the only way to achieve a truly progressive tax structure is to 
integrate corporate taxes so that those with more income carry the higher 
burden. To achieve vertical equity among taxpayers, all income profits and 
gains on equity investments, regardless of the entity invested in, should be 
taxed at progressive tax rates. 
Correcting the lack of vertical equity on the taxation of corporate 
investments can also address the revenue losses that can occur as a result of 
corporate integration. This would not only promote vertical equity, but also 
would minimize revenue loss by integrating the corporate and personal 
income taxes. It would eliminate the double tax and reduce the tax burden 
for some taxpayers while increasing the tax burden for higher income 
taxpayers, regardless of their classification as accredited investors or the 
type of entity they invest in. Instead, their income tax would be based only 
on the amount of their income. There would no longer be a lower tax rate 
available to those who have accumulated wealth in the past. Under the 
improved regime, if a taxpayer receives income from an equity investment, 
the logic behind its taxation would be the greater the income, the greater 
the ability to pay. 
In addition, if the real goal of tax policy is to tax wealth, then the 
partnership and hedge fund tax structures also should be overhauled to 
promote vertical equity.86
 
It is estimated that hedge fund assets will grow to 
over $ 1 trillion over the next five to ten years.87
 
The amount invested in 
partnerships and limited liability companies rather than corporations has 
also increased over the last 30 years,88
 
with business income generated by 
unincorporated forms growing from twenty-one percent in 1980 to fifty 
percent in 2008.89 Even if it is presumed that more high-income taxpayers 
hold stock, that does not change the lack of progressivity and as a result the 
lack of vertical equity faced by lower income taxpayers who make the 
 
 86.  The number of hedge funds has increased tremendously over the last 20 years and 
it has been projected that the assets held in hedge funds will exceed $1 trillion in the next 
five to ten years. Wallis K. Finger, Unsophisticated Wealth: Reconsidering the SEC’s 
“Accredited Investor” Definition Under the 1933 Act, 86 WASH U. L. REV. 733, 736 (2008-
09). 
 87.  Id.   
 88.  Bank, supra note 51, at 258. 
 89.  Id.  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same investment. 
A. Taking a Look at Integration 
Corporate integration seeks to eliminate the corporate income tax and 
tax earnings at the shareholder level.90
 
A number of experts and analysts 
believe the solution to corporate tax policy issues is to integrate the 
corporate and individual income rates so that a single rate applies to 
income generated by corporations. As argued by Michael Doran in 
Managers, Shareholders, and the Corporate Double Tax, “[b]oth 
policymakers and academics generally agree that the double tax results in 
significant distortions of economic and business decisions and argue for its 
repeal.”91
 
Many economists have proposed integration as a solution to the 
corporate tax’s inefficiencies, the competitive disadvantages produced by 
the double layer of tax and the high expenses incurred by corporations 
avoiding, complying or navigating the tax.92
 
Many critics of corporate integration assume that integration “would 
be accomplished at a substantial cost in revenue and progressivity, since a 
high proportion of dividends flows to high-income, wealthy individuals.”93 
However, as this article’s analysis has already shown, the current corporate 
tax policy is regressive and contravenes vertical equity. The solution to this 
is corporate integration. 
How integration should be implemented varies across proposals. Some 
proposals suggest a direct tax on shareholders on the corporation’s earnings 
while exempting corporate income from tax. Other proposals advocate 
taxing the corporation on the income it generates and excluding or 
exempting profits distributed or recognized by the shareholders. 
Full integration proposals suggest taxing corporate income at the tax 
rate of the corporation’s shareholders and completely eliminating the two 
layers of tax.94 Partnership taxation is a prevalent illustration of full 
integration and has been offered as a model for corporate integration. 
 
 90.  Sunley, supra note 74, at 626.  
 
  
 91.  Doran, supra note 32, at 528; see also American Law Institute, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAX PROJECT, SUBCHAPTER C: PROPOSALS OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE ON CORPORATE 
ACQUISITIONS AND DISPOSITIONS AND REPORTER’S STUDY ON CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS 
337 (1982) (highlighting “widespread discussion” on integrating corporate and shareholder 
taxes). 
 92.  See, e.g., Ballentine, supra note 51, at 7 (proposing integration as a solution to the 
double-level corporate income tax); Cunningham, supra note 33, at 445-448 (noting the 
context of worldwide policy, the competitive disadvantage created by the double tax rate on 
corporations in the United States). 
 93.  American Law Institute, supra note 91, at 328-29.  
 94.  Id.; Ballentine, supra note 51, at 7. 
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However, this mode of integration is routinely dismissed as highly complex 
and infeasible to administrate.95 
Partial integration proposals are usually adaptations of two 
fundamental integration structures. These proposals reduce the burden 
imposed by the double tax, but generally retain both taxes in some form. 
One approach to partial integration suggests retaining the corporate income 
tax while allowing the corporation to take a deduction for any dividends it 
pays to its shareholders.96 The second approach promotes retaining the 
corporate income tax, but providing a tax credit to shareholders for their 
share of corporate income taxes paid on dividends distributed to the 
shareholder.97 Integration proposals rarely advance beyond discussion and 
analysis because the transition to an integrated corporate tax structure could 
involve significant administrative upheaval and uncertainty.98
 
1. Integration Issues with Tax-Exempt and International Investors 
A significant challenge that integration proposals face is how to treat 
shareholders who avoid the shareholder tax under the current tax system, 
but are subject to the corporate income tax, in particular tax-exempt and 
foreign shareholders. Because of this challenge, many integration proposals 
focus on ways to achieve an integrated corporate tax while ensuring these 
unique shareholders are taxed on their share of corporate earnings.99 Some 
of the proposals resulting from this type of focus are not ideal and fail to 
advance vertical equity or resolve the repressiveness of corporate tax 
policy. Instead, such proposals either maintain or exacerbate the 
repressiveness of the tax. 
The complications involved in tailoring an integration proposal that 
captures these unique shareholders is especially problematic in the context 
of debt investments. Debt investments in a corporation are already a tax-
free investment as a result of the corporate income tax deduction for 
interest.100 The tax-exempt or foreign shareholder is not subject to tax on 
 
 95.  Id.  (“Many early proponents of integration have recognized a number of practical 
administrative problems that might be involved in shifting to a fully integrated—or even a 
partially integrated system.”); Sunley, supra note 74, at 625. 
 96.  American Law Institute, supra note 91, at 328. 
 97.  Id.  
 98.  See Ballentine, supra note 51, at 9 (providing that because of the difficulties of 
administering an integrated system, “there appears to be a temporary impasse with respect to 
any broadly based support for tax reform by way of integration”). 
 99.  See, e.g., Gravelle, supra note 46 at 14 (explaining his plan for integration).  
 100.  See Dept. of the Treasury, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX 
SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE 1 (1992) available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/integration.pdf (explaining 
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their receipt of interest income (by the United States) and the amount of 
interest distributed to these holders is not subject to corporate income tax 
because of the deduction corporations are permitted for interest paid. Tax-
exempt shareholders currently do not pay any tax on income they earn that 
is generated in partnerships and other pass though entities. Therefore, that 
income escapes taxation. 
Over sixty percent of shareholders in publicly held corporations are 
tax “insensitive” investors including foreign shareholders and tax-exempt 
entities such as 501(c)(3) entities, tax-deferred accounts, pension plans, 
retirement funds, and state and local governments.101 Hence, integration 
could lead to a significant revenue loss.102
 
There is, however, a point that is often overlooked when considering 
the tax consequences to tax-exempt entities in an integration proposal. That 
is that although the tax-exempt entity itself is exempt from taxation on its 
investments, in the case of deferred tax plans, 401(k) plans, pension plans 
and similar tax-exempt entities, when its corporate investments are 
distributed to the individual taxpayers, those taxpayers will pay tax on the 
amounts they receive at ordinary income rates.103 Therefore, the earnings 
generated by the corporation and the appreciation in the value of its stock 
does not entirely escape taxation, but is merely deferred and then taxed at 
ordinary income rates.104 Currently, tax-exempt entities bear their share of 
the corporate tax burden through the 34% corporate income tax and its 
investments being taxed a second time at ordinary income tax rates when 
distributions are made to their participants.105 
By maintaining the corporate income tax to ensure tax-exempt entities 
bear a portion of the corporate income tax burden, integration proposals 
actually increase the tax burdens borne by individual taxpayers who hold 
indirect ownership in the entities’ corporate investments. This again raises 
the specter of the regressive nature of the corporate tax as well as the 
limited choices of investment available to taxpayers. If the goal of these 
 
that corporate earnings distributed as interest to debt suppliers are only taxed once since the 
interest is deductible and taxed to lenders as ordinary income; see also Gravelle, supra note 
46 at 14 (noting the preferential tax treatment and admitting that there is no ideal solution.) 
 101.  Rydqvist, supra note 23, at 2-3; see Doran, supra note 32, at 542-43 (analyzing the 
twenty-five percent of corporate equity held by shareholders that are exempt from income 
tax); Gergen, supra note 64, at 156 (noting that sixty percent of tax equity is held by tax-
insensitive investors). 
 102.  See Doran, supra note 32, at 542-43 (analyzing the ramifications of the percentage 
of corporate equity held by income tax-exempt shareholders); Gergen, supra note 63, at 156 
(examining the makeup of investors that are not subject to income tax). 
 103.  I.R.C.§61(a); I.R.C §401(a); I.R.C. §401(k)(1); Treas. Reg. §1.401-1(a). 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id.  
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proposals is to avoid lost revenue as a result of shares owned by tax-exempt 
entities, then other revenue sources such as the income from partnership 
and LLC investments should be considered to mitigate the regressive 
nature of taxes on corporate investment. 
For similar reasons, integration proposals that support maintaining the 
corporate income tax and allowing dividends to be tax-exempt may 
actually undercut the benefits received by tax deferred and other retirement 
plans. If the corporate income tax is maintained and dividends are excluded 
from shareholder income, then the incentive to invest in tax-deferred plans 
is eliminated because it is just as profitable to hold stock directly rather 
than through a retirement plan.106 
Although foreign taxpayers are often subject to withholding structures, 
many treaties deliberately exempt certain types of income, including 
dividend income from taxation. Therefore, integration proposals that seek 
to continue the corporate income tax as a means of circumventing true tax 
exemption for foreign shareholders do so at the expense of vertical equity 
and ordinary taxpayers.107 Alternatives include modifying treaties to ensure 
these shareholders are subject to taxation, engaging the withholding 
systems that currently exist or allowing the income generated by 
corporations and distributed to foreign shareholders to escape taxation. 
Directly taxing foreign shareholders would also create more transparency 
in the corporate tax rules and simplify the current tax structure. 
2. Integration Issues – Corporate Managers and Retained Earnings 
Some experts have asserted that corporate integration has not 
successfully advanced into practice because corporate managers do not 
support integration.108 Corporate managers prefer the two layers of tax on 
corporate income because it allows them to exert greater control over 
retained earnings. The argument is that even if shareholders prefer 
integration, corporate managers will continue to oppose and lobby against 
pro-integration policies.109 Furthermore, many of the managers that do not 
openly oppose integration will at the very least demonstrate “managerial 
 
 106.  See Doran, supra note 32, at 547 (acknowledging that if there were not 
shareholder-level taxes imposed on dividends paid by stock held outside a plan, there would 
be no incentive for holding it inside the plan). 
 107.  See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society and the State: A Defense of the 
Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1205 (2004) (comparing maintaining the corporate tax 
to tax foreign shareholders in the United States to “letting the tail wag the dog”). 
 108.  See Jennifer Arlen & Debra Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 
YALE L. J. 325, 327 (1996) (attributing the otherwise “puzzling” persistence of the double-
level tax to the lobbying of corporate managers). 
 109.  Id. 
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diffidence” to its proposals.110 Some have argued that the corporate tax may 
be justified because a unique attribute of corporations is their managers 
have the ability to retain earnings and use them as necessary for corporate 
affairs.111 
Economic scholars used to assume that if the way dividends were 
taxed changed, then the dividend distribution policies of corporate 
managers would also change.112 The basic assumption was that if the tax 
cost imposed on dividends decreased, then more dividends would be 
distributed.113
 
 Instead, more recently, scholars have opined that a change in 
the tax costs affecting dividends does not affect the dividend distribution 
policies in the long term.114 Rather, the decisions by corporate managers 
regarding distributions of dividends are driven by other factors. As a result, 
the pressure on managers to distribute dividends from corporate income tax 
integration proposals should be irrelevant. Despite the reality that corporate 
tax policy is unlikely to affect the dividend distribution practices of 
corporate managers, these corporate managers continue to keep the issue at 
the forefront to discourage attempts at integration. The corporate managers 
suggest that integration proposals that provide for a deduction on dividends 
will be to the detriment of the corporation, as corporate managers are 
forced to distribute dividends because of the changes — a suggestion not 
supported at all by the facts. Over 70% of chief financial officers (CFOs) of 
dividend paying corporations asserted that dividend taxation did not, or 
 
 110.  Id. at 327. 
 111.  See Steve Bank, A Capital Lock-In Theory of the Corporate Income Tax, 94 GEO. 
L. J. 889, 893 (2006) (highlighting that managers in the corporate context may use corporate 
resources for “empire-building at the expense of shareholder interest”); Sunley, supra note 
74, at 622-623 (attributing business opposite to integration to concerns regarding unfairly 
dispersing its benefits across and within industries). 
 112.  See James M. Poterba & Lawrence H. Summers, The Economic Effects of Dividend 
Taxation, in RECENT ADVANCES IN CORPORATE FINANCE 267–69, 277 (1985)(discussing 
several competing hypotheses, based off of British data on security returns, dividend payout 
rates, and corporate investment, about the economic effects of dividend taxation); see also 
George R. Zodrow, On the “Traditional” and “New” Views of Dividend Taxation, 44 
NAT’L TAX J. 497, 504-07 (1991)(providing six studies of direct empirical evidence 
regarding the effects of dividend taxation).   
 113.  See Katherine Pratt, Deficits and the Dividend Tax Cut: Tax Policy as the 
Handmaiden of Budget Policy, 41 GA. L. REV. 503, 533 (2007)(explaining that the effects of 
a dividend tax cut would vary depending on the correct view of dividends—either traditional 
or new. For example, under the new view, a permanent dividend tax cut would result in 
elimination of the tax incentive to pay dividends). 
 114.  See Bank, supra note 1, at 518-520 (demonstrating through historical analysis that 
previous enactments of undistributed profits tax, irrespective of their severity, generally 
failed to affect dividend tax policy); see also Poterba & Summers, supra note 112 
(discussing the recent British tax policy changes and their applicability to the United States); 
Zodrow, supra note 112 (noting the lack of change in long term policies). 
ARTICLE 3 (CONWAY).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/29/15  2:24 PM 
2015] MONEY, MONEY, MONEY; IT’S A RICH MAN’S WORLD 1209 
 
probably did not, affect dividend distributions, and 87% of CFOs at non-
dividend distributing corporations stated that eliminating taxation of 
dividends would not, or probably would not, lead to an increase in the 
payment of dividends.115
  
“Integration of the corporate and shareholder 
income taxes might not affect corporate dividend policy as significantly as 
its proponents predict.”116 
Recently, the amount of dividends distributed did increase after the 
reduction in dividend tax rates in 2003; however, many postulated that this 
increase was temporary.117
  
Two explanations for the increase in dividend 
distributions include that managers were pressured to distribute more 
dividends at reduced rates, or alternatively, corporate managers were 
concerned that the reduction in dividend tax rates was temporary and 
therefore made distributions to take advantage of the change while they had 
a chance.118 As a result, once the reduced tax rate became permanent, the 
pressure on managers was eliminated.119 Second, reflecting the more recent 
proposition that tax policies do not affect dividend distribution rates, 
corporate managers pay dividends for other reasons, such as dividend 
payments sending a message about the health of the corporation.120 
Corporate managers prefer to retain earnings, which gives them the 
discretion to spend or save these funds.121
 
Therefore, corporate managers 
will evaluate integration proposals based on how they affect distribution, 
retention policies, and strategies.122 Corporate managers argue that by 
incentivizing distribution of retained earnings, Congress would be 
substituting its own business judgment for the judgment of corporate 
officers regarding the best time to distribute earnings.123
 
The double tax on 
corporate income creates an incentive to retain earnings because leaving 
 
 115.  Bank, supra note 1, at 517.   
 116.  Id. at 466. 
 117.  See Pratt, supra note 113, at 517 (discussing the 2003 dividend tax cut, where Bush 
proposed a dividend exclusion that “would have permitted shareholders to exclude from 
income 100% of dividends on corporate earnings that had already been fully taxed on the 
entity level”).   
 118.  Id. at 533–34. 
 119.  Id.   
 120.  Id. at 535 (citing Alon Brav, et. al., Payout Policy in the 21st
 
Century, 77 J. FIN. 
ECON. 483 (2005).   
 121.  See Bank, supra note 112, at 933-34 (positing that managers would rather that 
corporations rely on outside financing resources than take from their retained earnings by 
changing their dividend policy).    
 122.  See also Gergen, supra note 64, at 156 (stating that in evaluating proposals, 
managers aim to maximize shareholder value). 
 123.  See Bank, supra note 112, at 933-34 (“A forced change in dividend policy would 
effectively substitute ‘the blanket judgment of Congress and the Treasury department, based 
on a general theory,’ for the individual judgment of business managers, based on their direct 
knowledge of the needs of their particular company’”).  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the earnings in the corporation allows them to grow subject to only one 
level of taxation, avoiding the second dividend level tax.124
 
Some analysts 
have suggested that corporate managers are willing to subject corporate 
earnings to a second layer of tax if it preserves their ability to control the 
distribution of earnings.125
  
Consequently, rather than seeking the repeal of 
the double tax on corporate earnings, corporate managers express support 
for reduced tax rates or other tax preferences.126 Individual taxpayers also 
have an incentive for the corporation to retain the corporate earnings. When 
the tax rate for individuals is higher than the tax rate for corporations, 
higher income taxpayers may prefer leaving the earnings in the corporation, 
which permits those earnings to grow subject to the lower corporate tax 
rate.127 In this manner, the corporate form can serve as a tax shelter for 
high-income taxpayers.128
 
Larger distributions could help vertical equity in 
the sense that more distributions allow for a greater ability to pay taxes. 
Although corporate managers are protective of their control of 
retained earnings, the practice is subject to criticism. High amounts of 
retained earnings were cited as one of the causes of the Great Depression.129
  
Critics argued that the practice of retaining high amounts of earnings gave 
business managers too much confidence, causing them to act outside the 
best interests of the corporation.130
 
Recent corporate scandals raised similar 
criticisms, as some observers attributed the misuse of funds to the practice 
of corporate managers’ accumulation and hoarding of those corporate 
funds.131 
 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  See Bank, supra note 1, at 466 (“[e]ssentially, business agreed to trade double 
taxation and higher corporate income tax rates for the right to retain earnings without 
government interference.”). 
 126.  Bank, supra note 51, at 193; Sunley, supra note 74, at 622-623.   
 127.  Id.   
 128.  See Gergen, supra note 63, at 156 (explaining that a large portion of a company’s 
income can be shielded from being reported as taxable income by maximizing shareholder 
value through serving an identified tax clientele. That clientele benefits by having its tax 
attributes inputted into the company’s financial test for evaluating projects.).    
 129.  Bank, supra note 1, at 466, 506.   
 130.  See REXFORD G. TUGWELL, THE INDUSTRIAL DISCIPLINE AND THE GOVERNMENTAL 
ARTS 205 (1933)(explaining that the government has a social responsibility to regulate 
economic matters including business managers’ practice of retaining high amounts of 
earnings); 75 CONG. REC. 6341 (1932) (statement of Rep. McFadden) (arguing that 
corporations’ profits were too large, and that after dismissing workmen and cutting 
dividends sold to the public, with remaining surpluses, these corporations no longer 
benefitted the public or the corporations themselves); Speech Before the Democratic 
National Convention (July 2, 1932), 1 PUB. PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT 651 (1938) (providing that corporations retained unnecessary surpluses and 
expanded needlessly and speculatively, which led to the Great Depression). 
 131.  See Steven A. Bank, The Dividend Divide in Anglo-American Corporate Taxation, 
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Because of the issues raised by retained earnings, full integration 
proposals such as the partnership model, or the total elimination of the 
corporate income tax, are likely not feasible. Some form of the corporate 
income tax must continue to ensure that retained earnings are subject to tax, 
and are not forever exempt by being held within the corporation.132 
Otherwise, the corporate form would serve as a tax shelter for high-income 
taxpayers until they sold their interests in the corporation.133
 
It could also 
permit high-income taxpayers to completely escape taxation by holding 
onto the stock until death, and receiving a step-up, allowing the corporate 
earnings to completely escape taxation. 
3. Integration Proposals 
The Dividend Exclusion Method 
The 2003 reduction in dividend tax rates was an attempt at partial 
integration through dividend exclusions, which meant that the corporate 
income tax stayed intact, but the shareholders reduced their tax rate on 
dividends received.134  Originally the proposal had been to completely 
exclude dividends, but a modified version was ultimately enacted.135 
Corporate managers objected to the proposal because they were concerned 
about the possible pressure from investors to distribute tax-free earnings.136
 
Although the 2003 dividend rate cut was a move toward corporate and 
income tax integration, it did nothing to alleviate the regressive nature of 
corporate tax policy. Because the progressive ordinary income rates were 
 
30 J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2004-2005) (describing the concern that Enron and associated scandals 
were associated with the reported decline in dividend paying companies and President 
Bush’s proposal to eliminate double taxation was partially justified to address such a 
concern). 
 132.  Ballentine, supra note 51, at 8.   
 133.  Id. at 7 (“To omit any tax on retentions allows a large loophole for investors to 
channel their savings through corporations tax-free.”).   
 134.  Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 
302, 117 Stat. 752 (2003).  
 135.  H.R. 2, 108th Cong. § 201 (2003) (enacted); S. 2, 108th Cong. § 201 (2003) 
(enacted); see DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S 
FISCAL YEAR 2004 REVENUE PROPOSALS 12 (2003), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-
FY2004.pdf (providing an overview of the proposal for eliminating double taxation of 
corporate earnings); see also Pratt, supra note 110, at 517(describing President Obama’s 
2003 dividend exclusion proposal that would have allowed shareholders to exclude all 
dividends on corporate earnings that were already fully taxed on the entity level).   
 136.  Pratt, supra note 135 at 520–22,571 (stating others have argued that dividend tax 
cuts were not implemented correctly and should be repealed because they are ineffective at 
ensuring that corporate income is taxed once, and because of revenue loss); but see id. at 
517 (pointing out that there were at least some benefits to the dividend tax cuts).  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no longer applicable to dividends, higher income taxpayers had a lower tax 
rate available to them, making the corporate tax policy more regressive 
and, once again, failing to meet vertical equity. 
A dividend exclusion model could work to integrate personal and 
corporate taxes, and contribute to greater vertical equity, if the individual 
income tax rates for high-income investors were greater than the corporate 
income tax rates; this would ensure that income generated from non-
accredited investors would face a higher tax burden. Many countries in the 
European Union moved to a dividend exclusion model after the shareholder 
credit method was successfully attacked in the European Court of Justice.137
 
The dividend exclusion method of integration also ensures that tax-exempt 
entities and foreign persons are subject to at least one level of tax on their 
corporate equity investments.138 
 
The Shareholder Credit Method 
Another integration model that could be modified to promote the 
principles of vertical equity is the shareholder credit method. Many foreign 
countries have also enacted this form of integration.139 In the shareholder 
credit model of integration, the corporate income tax remains intact; the 
corporation pays the tax, and when dividends are distributed to 
shareholders, they also receive a tax credit equal to the relative portion of 
the corporate income taxes paid on those distributions. Therefore, while the 
corporation pays the tax, the corporation’s income is ultimately imputed to 
the shareholder. This method could serve vertical equity and eliminate the 
current regressive quality of the corporate tax. If the tax rates on dividends 
were progressive, and, as a result, high-income taxpayers had a tax rate 
higher than the corporate income tax rate, then the credit would alleviate 
some of the tax burden but provide for an additional tax on the proceeds. 
On the other hand, low-income taxpayers’ tax burden would be met by the 
credit. Certain shareholder credit models go further to improve vertical 
equity by allowing shareholders a refundable credit, so if the taxpayer’s 
personal tax rate is lower than the corporate tax rate, he or she actually gets 
a refund.140 This would make the corporate tax more progressive. 
Moreover, some shareholder credit proposals suggest that the corporate 
income tax rate should match the highest personal income tax rate to 
 
 137.  See Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination and the 
Political and Economic Integration of Europe, 115 YALE L. J. 1186, 1212 (2006) (detailing 
countries in the European Union’s tax policies).  
 138.  Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. 
International Taxation, 46 DUKE L. J. 1021, 1025, 1033 (1996-97).  
 139.  See Gravelle, supra note 46, at 14. 
 140.  Bank, supra note 51, at 225. 
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prevent the corporation from serving as a tax shelter for high rate 
individuals.141 A downside to this approach, however, is that it raises 
corporate tax rates even higher, which may further damage the 
competitiveness of the United States.142 
 
The CBIT 
The Treasury Department designed an integration model in 1992 
called the Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT). The goal of the 
CBIT was to integrate personal and corporate income taxes, and at the 
same time, come up with equivalent tax rules for partnerships and other 
types of business.143 This type of proposal could have achieved vertical 
equity among investment types by establishing the same tax models for 
equity investments by both accredited and non-accredited investors, 
provided the tax rates are progressive. The CBIT taxes almost all 
businesses alike, regardless of form.144 In the original CBIT proposal, most 
distributions received would be excluded from tax.145 Because the CBIT 
would serve a flat tax on investment income, it would not create a more 
progressive tax burden, although it would alleviate the regressivity in 
current corporate tax policy.146 Moreover, the CBIT could create an even 
more regressive system because of ability-to-pay concerns. 
Accordingly, to achieve vertical equity within the CBIT system, the 
corporate tax rate would have to be lower than the tax rate available to 
other types of entities that non-accredited investors are precluded from 
investing in, or there would have to be an additional tax to high-income 
taxpayers on their investment to create the necessary progressivity. The 
CBIT did safeguard the revenue from tax-exempt and foreign investors 
who would not escape taxation under the CBIT. 
Similar to the shareholder credit method, because it may require a 
higher tax rate to maintain progressivity, it might not enhance the 
competitiveness of the United States internationally. 
 
The BEIT 
The Business Enterprise Income Tax (BEIT) is an integration proposal 
designed by the former Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, 
Edward Kleinbard. The BEIT taxes all income from equity interests in 
 
 141.  Gergen, supra note 63, at 146. 
 142.  American Law Institute, supra note 91, at 393; GRAVELLE, supra note 46, at 14. 
 143.  DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX 
SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE 39 (1992), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/integration.pdf. 
 144.  Id.   
 145.  Id.   
 146.  See Sunley, supra note 74, at 632 (discussing the affect the CBIT would have).  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partnerships and corporations at an identical rate.147 The corporation 
receives a deduction for a fixed percentage of its capital, and the investors 
receive a tax bill for a corresponding fixed percentage on their investment 
(debt or equity). The individual taxpayers pay the tax.148 The BEIT removes 
the regressivity of the corporate tax because investors are assessed a tax 
under the BEIT, and then also pay tax on the income they receive at their 
personal income tax rates. An investor in a corporation is taxed on his 
investment based upon an imputed rate of return, regardless of the amount 
distributed.149
 
 The BEIT imposes an entity tax rate between twenty-five to 
twenty-eight percent.150 The investor tax rates would be graduated and 
progressive.151
 
If investors receive distributions exceeding the imputed 
percentage, there is an additional tax.152
 
  The BEIT reverses the 
regressivity of current corporate tax policy because the personal tax rates 
on the investment income are progressive, and equity investments in 
partnerships no longer have a lower tax burden than equity investments in 
corporations, putting accredited and non-accredited investors on equal 
footing. 
Nonetheless, the BEIT does not completely resolve lack of vertical 
equity. The BEIT creates an ability to pay issue and an affordability issue. 
The BEIT requires investors to pay tax on these percentages even if the 
investment loses value.153 The BEIT imposes the tax even on investments 
that lose value, under the assumption that the decrease in value must be 
illusory otherwise investors would dispose of the investment.154 As a result, 
 
 147.  See Edward D. Kleinbard, Rehabilitating the Business Income Tax, BROOKINGS 
INSTITUTION THE HAMILTON PROJECT (2007) [hereinafter Rehabilitating the Business 
Income Tax](presenting Kleinbard’s BEIT proposal for parallel taxation of capital income, 
including integrating taxes at the corporate and individual levels); see also Edward D. 
Kleinbard, The Business Enterprise Income Tax: A Prospectus,106 TAX NOTES 97, 98 
(2005)[hereinafter The Business Enterprise Income Tax](describing the BEIT as a means of 
minimizing the role of tax considerations in business thinking, by implementing, among 
others, a single tax system); but see Alvin Warren, The Business Enterprise Income Tax: A 
First Appraisal, 118 TAX NOTES 921, 926 (2008) (…). 
 148.  Warren, supra note 147, at 98. 
 149.  Id.; Warren, supra note 147, at 97-98; Kleinbard, Rehabilitating the Business 
Income Tax, supra note 147 at 36. 
 150.  Kleinbard, Rehabilitating the Business Income Tax, supra note 147 at 36 
 151.  Id.   
 152.  Id.; Warren, supra note 147, at 921, 925. 
 153.  See Rehabilitating the Business Income Tax, supra note 147 (discussing the fact 
that the BEIT is able to achieve a comprehensive and consistent taxation of capital income 
and reduce tax-planning incentives, by integrating taxes at the corporate and individual 
levels, ensuring that all income is taxed once); but see Warren, supra note 147, at 921, 928 
(2008) (arguing that the BEIT perhaps does not achieve all of its goals and purposes). 
 154.  See Rehabilitating the Business Income Tax, supra note 147 (discussing the 
logistics and implementation of the BEIT); Kleinbard, The Business Enterprise Income Tax: 
ARTICLE 3 (CONWAY).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/29/15  2:24 PM 
2015] MONEY, MONEY, MONEY; IT’S A RICH MAN’S WORLD 1215 
 
the BEIT creates an ability to pay issue, forcing taxpayers who lack 
sufficient liquidity to sell their investment to pay the tax bill.155 If the 
investment has lost value, ultimately the taxpayers recognize that loss when 
the investment is sold because of basis adjustments, but the taxpayers with 
a lower ability to pay would still be forced to sell their investment because 
of this nuance in the proposal.156 Further, not all of the tax rates in the BEIT 
are progressive; if excess distributions are made, those distributions are 
taxed at a flat rate.157 To promote vertical equity, the proposal would have 
to be amended, however, to provide for progressive rates on excess 
distributions. 
The BEIT also does not resolve how to address tax-exempt 
investors.158  The BEIT makes suggestions for numerous options regarding 
tax-exempt shareholders, including taxing them or excluding them 
altogether, but does not advocate a particular position.159  Moreover, the 
BEIT simply exempts foreign investors from taxation.160  It is unclear how 
these changes could affect revenue. 
Finally, other integration proposals such as business activities tax 
(BAT), the consumption tax, the value-added tax (VAT), and the flat tax 
propose taxing income at flat rates. As a result, they would not serve to 
promote vertical equity.161 
 
The Deduction for Dividends 
A corporate deduction for dividends distributed is another alternative 
that could create vertical equity in corporate tax policy while not affecting 
the accredited investor rules.162  This method of integration leaves the 
 
A Prospectus, supra note 147, at 100 (expanding further on the BEIT); but see Warren, 
supra note 147, at 921, 929 (arguing against the presumption that decreases are illusory). 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  See Rehabilitating the Business Income Tax, supra note 147 (distinguishing 
between flat and progressive taxes); but see Warren, supra note 147, at 921, 927 (providing 
an alternate interpretation of the BEIT’s flat and progressive tendencies). 
 158.  See Kleinbard, Rehabilitating the Business Income Tax, supra note 147, at 36 
(explaining the fact that BEIT would not affect tax-exempt investors is not a flaw with 
BEIT). 
 159.  Id. at 36-38.   
 160.  Id. at 36. 
 161.  See generally Cunningham & Engler, supra note 33 (proposing an integrated 
corporate and income tax as a consumption tax, as well as explaining other versions of VAT 
and flat taxes as solutions to the corporate integration issue).  However, because the article 
does not recognize the current lack of equity in the corporate tax as a result of accredited 
investor standards and the corporate tax rate, these solutions do not serve to address vertical 
equity issues.  
 162.  The dividend deduction method had been enacted earlier in the history of the 
corporate income tax.  However, it was short lived and was enacted during a different 
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underlying corporate tax in place, allowing Congress to continue to use the 
corporate tax as a tool to regulate or control corporate behavior.  The 
corporation calculates its corporate tax and then is permitted a deduction 
for any dividend distributions it paid.  Any earnings that are retained are 
typically still taxed in a dividend deduction proposal, and shareholders 
must pay a tax on the amounts they are distributed.  If the tax on the 
shareholders is progressive, this method can eliminate the regressive nature 
of the corporate tax with respect to the amounts that are distributed, 
because just like equity in other types of investments, corporate equity 
would only be subject to a single layer of tax.  Another benefit of choosing 
an integration method that leaves the corporate tax in place is that corporate 
earnings are not able to escape taxation entirely by using the estate tax.  
Without a corporate income tax, a shareholder could hold onto stock as it 
appreciated in value and receive a step-up in basis to the fair market value 
at death, allowing the corporate income to escape taxation.163  If a 
shareholder seeks to use the estate tax to circumvent the corporate tax, the 
earnings left in the corporation will be taxed because they are not 
distributed. 
Despite those benefits of a dividend deduction, it is possible that tax-
exempt and foreign shareholders could escape all taxation on their share of 
corporate earnings because the tax at the corporate level is eliminated for 
distributions.  This method is often criticized because of the difficulty in 
taxing foreign investors.164
  
If the dividend deduction were chosen as the 
integration method, this special class of taxpayers could be subject to a 
direct tax and subject to withholding or completely excluded from tax.  
Another critique of the dividend deduction integration method is that it 
could put pressure on corporate managers to make distributions of earnings 
to shareholders, because the corporate tax only applies if earnings are 
retained; if they are distributed, there is a deduction.165  A possible solution 
is to provide an allowance for capital investments, such as deductions for 
depreciation and research and development credits. 
The American Law Institute (ALI) has lent its support in the past to a 
 
economic time.  See e.g. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND 
MATERIALS ON BUSINESS TAX ISSUES PREPARED FOR THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND 
MEANS TAX POLICY DISCUSSION SERIES (Doc JCX023-02) (2002), available at 
http://www.jct.gov/x-23-02.pdf (discussing foreign and domestic taxation). 
 163.  26 U.S.C. § 1014 (2014).   
 164.  See U.S. DEP’T. OF THE TREASURY, supra note 48, at 107 (explaining why a 
dividend deduction is against US policy).  
 165.  See Bank, supra note 1, at 535 (explaining why it is beneficial for shareholders to 
allow managers to retain earnings); see also Mark P. Gergen, supra note 63, at 156 
(explaining that where shareholders pay the initial tax, managers are indifferent to reported 
income). 
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dividend deduction method of integration, suggesting that dividends on 
newly issued shares receive some degree of tax relief.166
  
The ALI’s 
proposal was restricted to newly issued equity because a deduction on 
previously issued equity could create a windfall for earnings already built 
into stock existing at the time of enactment.167
  
Moreover, the ALI did not 
suggest a complete dividend deduction, which might create pressure on 
corporations to distribute excess or extraordinary dividends to take 
advantage of the deduction.168 
 
The Treasury Department has also raised the 
possibility of integration through partial dividend deduction.  In 1984, it 
recommended 50% corporate deduction for dividends paid.169 
 
The 
subsequent Presidential tax proposal the following year included a 10% 
corporate dividend deduction.170
  
Neither proposal received the support of 
Congress or businesses. 
The partial deduction for dividends would serve to lower the tax 
burden on corporate equity investments, but it would not completely 
alleviate the lack of vertical equity because the accredited investor 
standards would still permit high-income taxpayers to invest in equity that 
non-accredited investors could not at a lower tax burden.  In addition, while 
the partial deductions would lower the rate, it would not lower them 
enough to create a progressive tax system when compared with the 
effective rates on other business entities. 
A full dividend deduction would meet the goals of vertical equity.  
The income generated by the corporate investments would be taxed at 
individual taxpayer’s personal income tax rates, which would be 
progressive.  This single layer of tax, mirroring how the income generated 
from pass though entitlements is taxed at the personal income rates, would 
mean that the distortion created by the accredited investor standard would 
no longer prevent vertical equity.  Because the tax burden on these 
investments would now be progressive, the regressive nature to the 
corporate tax policy would be eliminated.  The difficulty to enacting a 
dividend deduction is, similar to the BEIT, how to treat tax-exempt and 
foreign shareholders.  The dividend deduction method of integration would 
result in an increase in the competitiveness of the United States. 
In addition, this integration method is likely to garner opposition from 
 
 166.  American Law Institute, supra note 91, at 328; Alvin C. Warren, Jr., AM. LAW 
INST., Integration of the Individual and Corporate Income Taxes, Reporter’s Study of 
Corporate Tax Integration (1993). 
 167.  Id. at 330; see also Thomas D. Griffity, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 715, 739 (1983) 
(explaining the problematic windfall).  
 168.  American Law Institute, supra note 91, at 330. 
 169.  U.S. DEP’T. OF THE TREASURY, supra note 82, at 124. 
 170.  See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 162, at 47 (explaining the 
history of dividend tax deduction proposals) 
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corporate managers because of the tax that would remain on retained 
earnings.  If a corporate income tax deduction for dividends were enacted, 
corporate managers might spend as much money as possible to avoid being 
forced to make distributions and retain control over corporate earnings, 
even to the detriment of the corporation.  For example, corporate managers 
might seek out expenses that are deductible immediately, rather than capital 
expenditures, which might be a wiser investment in the long run, to avoid 
paying taxes on retained earnings.  A solution could be to create a capital 
investment and cash reserve fund that is exempt from the corporate income 
tax until the capital project is sold, or as long as the cash is reserved for 
certain types of expenses such as employment contracts, research and 
development, or other preferred expenses. 
4. Issues with Integration 
Rationales made by observers for why corporate integration proposals 
fail include speculating that resistance to corporate tax integration 
proposals emanates not only from corporate managers, but also from 
industries that benefit from two layers of tax (i.e. investment banks, 
accounting firms and others that profit from creating corporate income tax 
shelters), and tax-exempt shareholders.171 
 
Another possible reason why the 
two layers of tax on corporate income continue is a fear of the unknown.  
While inefficient and cumbersome, it is familiar and has withstood 
economic upheaval, and there is risk involved in changing the corporate 
income tax structure.  Although the ideal time for a significant change in 
corporate tax policy is during an economic recovery, such as the dramatic 
policy changes made following the Great Depression,172 it can be an 
intimidating proposition because of this aversion to risk. 
Hesitancy to adopt an integration tax policy also results from the 
perception that the general public disapproves of corporate integration.173 
 
It 
is conceivable that the public perceives the integration of corporate and 
shareholder taxes as a “corporate tax break” and overlooks the reality that 
individual taxpayers ultimately bear the burden of the corporate income tax 
while corporations are simply a conduit to collect it.174  “The public is 
 
 171.  See Doran, supra note 32, at 521 (explaining opposition to changing double 
taxation). 
 172.  See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, Pub. L. No. 74-740, 49 Stat. 1648 
(establishing a major tax overhaul on corporations); Hearings on H.R. 12395 Before the S. 
Comm. on Fin., 74th Cong. 93 (1936) (statement of M.L. Seidman, chairman, Tax 
Committee, New York Board of Trade). 
 173.  See Brauner, supra note 7, at 593 (arguing that it is hard to change taxing policy 
because of popular sentiment). 
 174.  The number of accredited individual investors was estimated to be between 5 and 
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typically in favor of taxing corporations, yet they are frequently confused 
about who bears the burden of the tax.”175  The public tends to prefer the 
corporate tax to other alternative ways to raise revenue, viewing the 
corporate tax as a way to address cynicism about corporate tax behavior.176 
Furthermore, the lack of vertical equity has been absent from the 
integration debate.  As a result, the general public is ignorant to the high 
tax burdens applicable to corporate investments, in contrary to the low tax 
burdens faced by higher income taxpayers, who are accredited investors 
with the choice of other investments options unavailable to most of the 
general public.177 
Another reason there has been little momentum to actualize and 
integrate corporate income tax is that, in addition to generating revenue, the 
corporate income tax is also a valuable tool for Congress to control 
corporations.  Congress can influence the governance of corporations and 
maintain oversight of corporate management by providing tax incentives 
and disincentives to corporate managers.178 
 
Nevertheless, whether these 
attempts at regulating corporate behavior have been successful and merit 
the additional complexity and tax burdens the corporate income tax carries 
is questionable.  Consider, for example, the regulation of executive 
compensation, which has been ineffective.179 
 
The tax rules are generally 
ineffective at influencing the compensation practices in corporations, which 
makes the government relatively powerless unless the compensation 
package somehow violates securities laws.180  Congress can use the 
corporate tax to encourage investments in retirement accounts by 
establishing many types of retirement accounts as tax-exempt entities. 
Ultimately, the corporate income tax may exist today not because it 
represents the best corporate tax policy, but because abolishing the 
 
7.2 million people prior to enactment of Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, supra note 13, at 413, which decreased the number of accredited investors 
by excluding the primary residence from the calculation of net worth; see Shane, supra note 
84 (discussing number of accredited informal investors). 
 175.  Clausing, supra note 4, at 419. 
 176.  Cf. Thorndike, supra note 85, at 360 (discussing the public’s support of the 
corporate tax). 
 177.  See JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 35, at 2 (explaining that the public does not 
realize who bears the burden of taxes); see also David Weisbach, supra note 54, at 218 
(explaining it is individuals, not firms, who bear the burden of taxes).   
 178.  See Avi-Yonah, supra note 62, at 1245-49 (explaining the regulatory role of 
corporate tax). 
 179.  See generally Meredith R. Conway, Money for Nothing and the Stocks for Free: 
Taxing Executive Compensation, 17 CORNELL J. L. PUB. POL’Y 383 (2008) (discussing 
Congress’ attempts to tax executive compensation).   
 180.  Cf. id. (discussing the ineffectiveness of Congress’ attempts to rein in executive 
compensation).  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corporate income tax would be controversial and, therefore, a politically 
unpopular position to take.181  Although such a change would create 
vertical equity and remove the regressive nature of corporate tax policy, the 
general public does not recognize that the corporate income tax is primarily 
borne by the shareholders or individuals and not by the corporate entity.182 
 
Additionally, corporate managers are likely to oppose any such proposals 
because they risk losing the benefits of the corporate income tax, including 
control over retained earnings as well as industry specific tax breaks that 
many corporations seek from Congress.183 
CONCLUSION 
Corporate tax policy is outdated and no longer accurately affects the 
wealth it was enacted to tax.  Instead of taxing the intended wealthy, the 
corporate tax burdens lower income taxpayers with an unfairly high tax 
burden, while those with higher incomes are able to avail themselves of 
lower tax burden investment choices.  This is a violation of the 
fundamental tax principle of vertical equity.  Because non-accredited 
investors are limited to investments in corporate entities, by the accredited 
investor standards, the higher tax burdens imposed under the tax code 
violates principles of fairness.  Meanwhile wealthy and high-income 
taxpayers can choose between investing in corporations or investments 
with lower effective tax rates. 
Corporate tax policy combined with the accredited investor standards 
cause distortions in individual and business’ behavior and investment 
choices and penalize ordinary taxpayers.  Furthermore, corporate tax policy 
has become complicated and difficult to navigate and administer.  The tax 
rates are prohibitive, causing the United States to lose competitiveness.  
Integration of the corporate and income taxes can resolve these issues, 
creating vertical equity and reducing regressivity while increasing the 
competitiveness of the corporate tax policy of the United States.  Many of 
the integration proposals made to date focus on the taxation of tax-exempt 
entities and foreign persons, as well as the interests of corporate managers 
to the detriment of the fairness to non-accredited investors.  Many of the 
models of integration ignore the lack of fairness and vertical equity in 
 
 181.  See generally Avi-Yonah, supra note 62, at 1211 (explaining the general public’s 
reticence to changing the corporate tax); but see Brauner, supra note 7, at 629 (arguing that 
the assumption that the assumptions regarding the purpose of corporate taxes are incorrect).  
 182.  See Avi-Yonah, supra note 62, at 1211 (explaining the generally held view that the 
public views corporations as bearing the burden of corporate tax).   
 183.  See Sunley, supra note 74, at 622 (explaining the business communities’ opposition 
to changing the tax laws).  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current corporate tax policy, while others are under the perception that 
integration many actually reduce vertical equity.  Despite these 
misconceptions, most integration policies, with some slight modifications, 
can achieve these goals and serve to increase vertical equity. 
Corporate investment is subject to two layers of tax.  At current rates, 
this is a flat tax.  In addition, because the burden of the corporate tax 
typically falls on labor, it is a regressive tax that violates vertical equity.184
  
Moreover, the corporate rate itself is so high that the tax has a tendency to 
be regressive because it is the only tax rate available to non-accredited 
investors, while high-income accredited investors have other investment 
choices that include investments subject to a single tax rate.185
  
Even if that 
single rate is at ordinary income levels, the accredited investor bears a 35 
percent burden while the non-accredited investor bears a 44.75 percent tax 
burden on an investment in an otherwise identical business.  This imposes 
an additional 9.75 percent tax on the non-accredited investor merely 
because he does not have a high enough income level to select the more 
tax-efficient investment.  The inequity is magnified if the companies earn 
capital gain income, giving the accredited investor a fifteen percent tax 
rate, which is 29.75 percent lower than the tax rate of the non-accredited 
investor.  Hedge funds, partnerships, limited liability companies, and a 
variety of other business choices are only available to accredited investors 
who earn high incomes or have a certain amount of wealth.  This makes the 
double tax on corporations unfair from both a vertical and a horizontal 
equity standpoint. 
Finally, to address the vertical inequity and the loss of revenue, this 
proposal suggests that all investment income be subject to progressive, 
ordinary income tax rates.  With essentially a single layer of tax, the tax 
burden to non-accredited investors would significantly decrease while 
those with higher income levels would see their effective tax rates increase, 
raising revenue and promoting vertical equity. 
 
 
 184.  See GENTRY, supra note 56, at 32, 35 (explaining that corporate tax generally falls 
on labor). 
 185.  Id.  
